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 Over the past decade, several scholars have advocated for international standards 
in medical ethics and human rights 
[1–3]. Others have countered that 
such standards risk ignoring important 
cultural differences in the way people 
conceptualize medical decision-making 
[4–8]. Within this debate hangs a 
question for international bioethics: as 
developing countries build allopathic 
medical systems, what should their 
bioethics be? In this essay, we explore 
possible answers to this question, 
ultimately arguing that Western 
bioethics is insufﬁ cient to solve the 
problems that arise in the practice of 
allopathic medicine in non-Western 
contexts.
 As an example, we discuss recent 
conﬂ icts over the use of mechanical 
ventilators in Thailand. Thailand is 
a center of cutting-edge allopathic 
medical care in Asia. It has a universal 
health-care system, which provides 
many Thais with access to mechanical 
ventilation. So many Thais are placed 
on mechanical ventilators at the end 
of life that it has become one of the 
largest drains on Thailand’s universal 
health-care system [9]. Furthermore, 
the use of ventilators has become a 
source of vehement national debate, 
mostly as a result of several prominent 
political ﬁ gures who received overly 
aggressive medical care at the end of 
life [10,11]. As in Western hospitals, 
the ascension of mechanical ventilation 
has introduced a host of difﬁ cult 
ethical dilemmas for doctors, families, 
and patients [12,13]. How will Thais 
go about solving these dilemmas? On 
which principles of bioethics will they 
rely? 
 To answer these questions, we start 
with a case that illustrates a common 
ethical dilemma about withdrawal 
of mechanical ventilation in Thai 
intensive care units. We then explore 
some concepts from Western bioethics 
to see if they help resolve this dilemma. 
Finally, we explain some of the local 
ethics behind the case and discuss the 
concept of a Thai bioethics to address 
the use of ventilators in Thailand. 
 A Case Scenario
 The following ﬁ ctional case is based 
on 30 ethnographic interviews and 
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two months of participant-observation 
ﬁ eldwork by one of us (SS) in 2005. 
The case contains themes that arose 
frequently during this research.
 Gaew, a 39-year-old Thai construction 
worker, falls from a scaffold and hits his 
head on the pavement. He is unconscious 
by the time he arrives at one of Bangkok’s 
cutting-edge emergency rooms. He is 
intubated and placed in the intensive 
care unit. Gaew’s physician, Dr. Nok, 
informs Gaew’s brother, Lek, that Gaew 
has little chance of recovery due to his 
lack of brain activity. 
 Lek does not know what to do—he 
wants to give his brother the best care 
possible, but he knows his brother is 
suffering. He would like to remove 
Gaew’s ventilator. Dr. Nok replies that this 
is impossible because it is unethical to 
remove ventilators. Very few physicians 
in Thailand withdraw ventilators from 
patients [10]. They have a complex array 
of reasons for declining to withdraw 
ventilator support, including their 
medical training, fear of litigation, and 
belief in the sanctity of life. 
 As with most Thai physicians, Dr. 
Nok’s refusal to withdraw the ventilator 
is explicitly Buddhist. The ﬁ rst precept 
of Buddhism forbids killing. Other 
Buddhist doctrines teach that the last 
part of the body to die is the breath. 
For a Thai Buddhist physician, pulling 
out a patient’s ventilator may feel 
like pulling out the patient’s soul. If 
Dr. Nok withdraws Gaew’s ventilator, 
she will necessarily have “ill-will” or 
“repugnance” in her mind [14,15]. In 
Buddhist terms, Dr. Nok’s own karma is 
at stake. Karma is a moral law, central 
to lay Thai Buddhism, which describes 
chains of cause and effect that result 
from individual behavior. Actions 
generate either merit or demerit, and 
the balance of these two currencies 
determines one’s spiritual future 
[10,15,16]. If Dr. Nok’s mind contains 
ill-will or repugnance, she will accrue 
demerit, which will negatively affect her 
in this and future lifetimes. 
 Neither Lek nor Dr. Nok ask what 
Gaew would have wanted in his current 
situation. They do not ponder this 
question because in lay Thai Buddhism, 
the self is seen as different from moment 
to moment—so Gaew is not the same 
person now as he was ten days ago. To 
Dr. Nok and Lek, an advance directive 
seems ludicrous. How could a person 
know what he would want years later, in 
a different state of consciousness [10]?
 Dr. Nok is ready with a strategy for 
circumventing their dilemma. She tells 
Lek that together they must help Gaew 
“let go.” She explains that it is Gaew’s 
mental attachments that are keeping 
him alive and suffering on the ventilator. 
When Dr. Nok says “attachments,” 
she uses the Thai word for “knot of 
problems” (bpom bpan ha), implying a 
gnarled set of worries tangling Gaew’s 
mind and keeping him from achieving 
mental clarity and letting go of life. She 
asks Lek what Gaew might be worried 
about. Lek replies that Gaew wanted 
to ordain as a monk before dying. 
Although they cannot know what is 
in Gaew’s mind in his new state of 
consciousness, this is a possible element 
in his “knot.” 
 Dr. Nok suggests that Lek go to 
Bangkok and ordain as a monk for several 
days in Gaew’s stead, then return to tell 
Gaew what he has done. She explains 
that even though Gaew has little brain 
activity, when all of the senses subside, 
the spirit may still take in sound [15]. She 
hopes that when Gaew hears about his 
brother’s ordination, he may let go and 
die with the ventilator still attached and 
running. This way, she and Lek can relieve 
Gaew’s suffering without compromising 
their karma.
 How Would Western Bioethics 
Handle this Case?
 There has been a recent fervor of 
discussion in many Western medical 
schools about culture and bioethics [8]. 
Medical students and physicians are 
being trained in “cultural competence” 
to help them handle a culturally 
diverse society. This training usually 
focuses on prototypic cases meant to 
exemplify particular cultural or ethnic 
groups. In general, it is assumed that 
the principles of Western bioethics—
autonomy, beneﬁ cence, non-
maleﬁ cence, truth-telling, and justice—
are universal. Different cultures are 
seen as emphasizing these principles 
differently, rather than as operating on 
unique principles of their own.
 A classic example, taught in many 
United States medical schools, is the 
story of the “Asian” elder who comes 
into the hospital, and whose son says 
“please, do not tell my father that he 
has cancer.” Most Western physicians 
would analyze this situation as follows: 
the son believes that knowing about 
the illness will hurt his father; the son 
values beneﬁ cence (doing what is best 
for the patient) over autonomy (the 
patient’s prerogative to make decisions 
for himself) and thus wants to conceal 
the illness from his father. In this 
analysis, the principles of bioethics 
are held to be universal—the son’s 
culture simply makes him value these 
principles in a unique proportion.
 This approach proves unhelpful in 
understanding Gaew’s case. Dr. Nok’s 
refusal to remove the ventilator is not 
based on Gaew’s wishes; it is not based 
on what is best for Gaew; and it is not 
about what is most truthful, or what is 
best for Thais as a whole. None of these 
fundamental principles of Western 
bioethics—autonomy, beneﬁ cence, 
non-maleﬁ cence, truth-telling, or 
justice—sufﬁ ciently explain Lek and 
Dr. Nok’s dilemma. Even though the 
hospital taking care of Gaew is a center 
of allopathic medicine—a form of 
medicine grown out of the West—it is 
nonetheless a zone governed at least 
partially by non-Western bioethical 
principles. 
 A tool central to the practice 
of bioethics in Western hospitals 
is delineating between different 
kinds of dilemmas. The most widely 
read textbook of bioethics in the 
West, by Beauchamp and Childress, 
distinguishes between at least 
three kinds of dilemmas: (1)  ethical 
dilemmas , where two ethical principles 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030439.g002
 Statues of monks, like this ﬁ gure at Wat 
U Mong Klang Wiang, are common sites 
for Thai Buddhists’ offerings 
 (Photo: Scott Stonington) 
October 2006  |  Volume 3  |  Issue 10  |  e439
PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 1681
dictate opposite actions; (2)  self-
interest dilemmas , where the decision-
maker’s own self-interest conﬂ icts 
with a decision dictated by an ethical 
principle; and (3)  practical dilemmas , 
where something logistical prevents an 
ethical decision from being enacted 
[17]. Making these distinctions is often 
the ﬁ rst task that a physician must 
complete during an ethics consult. One 
must separate the entangled needs of 
doctors and family members from the 
ethical principles that determine how 
to treat a patient.
 So what kind of dilemma are Lek 
and Dr. Nok confronting? Are the 
principles governing their behavior 
ethical, practical, or self-interested? 
Take, for example, Dr. Nok’s reason 
for not withdrawing the ventilator: to 
do so would be revoking a patient’s 
life. At ﬁ rst, this sounds like an ethical 
principle, a kind of non-maleﬁ cence. 
But on closer inspection, the 
principle beneath her action diverges 
signiﬁ cantly from non-maleﬁ cence. In a 
Buddhist framework, killing is ethically 
wrong because it deﬁ les the mind of 
the killer. Even if Dr. Nok thinks that 
withdrawing the ventilator is the most 
compassionate thing for Gaew, it would 
be spiritually disadvantageous for her. 
As one Thai physician explained, “it 
may be the best thing for the patient 
[to withdraw the ventilator], but how 
could you ﬁ nd someone who would do 
it?” A Thai physician would not want 
to take the risk of acquiring spiritual 
demerit. 
 It would then be tempting to say that 
Dr. Nok’s situation represents a self-
interest dilemma. An ethical decision—
compassionately relieving suffering by 
removing the ventilator—is in conﬂ ict 
with Dr. Nok’s concern for her own 
spiritual fate. But this interpretation 
also breaks down because the precise 
thing that would generate demerit 
for Dr. Nok is ill-will toward Gaew. 
In a Buddhist ethical framework, it is 
impossible to withdraw a ventilator with 
beneﬁ cent intent. In Dr. Nok’s case, 
self-interest and ethical duty are so 
intertwined as to be indistinguishable. 
The distinction made between self-
interest and ethical dilemmas collapses. 
The ﬁ rst task of a Western ethicist—to 
determine the type of dilemma at 
work—proves an impasse in Gaew’s 
case.
 The fact that a Western bioethical 
approach fails in Gaew’s case may be 
an indication of the limitations of 
the “one-size-ﬁ ts-all” bioethics used 
in Western hospitals as much as it is 
an illustration of local differences in 
ethical reasoning (Damien Keown, 
personal correspondence). Western 
bioethics is a young discipline, and 
draws on only a minority of the rich 
history of Western ethical philosophy 
[18]. Nonetheless, the conceptual 
tools of Western bioethics dominate 
policy, law, bureaucracy, and physician 
decision-making in Western hospitals. 
These concepts are beginning to have 
weight in policy-making in Thailand 
[19]. Gaew’s case makes it clear 
that one must examine local ethical 
concepts before uncritically importing 
Western bioethical tools.
 Does Thailand Need a Thai 
Bioethics?
 Dr. Nok’s solution to Gaew’s end-of-life 
is instructive as an introduction to what 
a Thai bioethics might look like. Dr. 
Nok and Lek cannot remove Gaew’s 
ventilator, and yet their compassion 
and duty demand that they relieve 
his suffering. They circumvent this 
dilemma by helping Gaew to let go of 
his life peacefully. This strategy has 
a positive effect on the karmic fate 
of everyone involved. They relieve 
Gaew’s suffering. Lek acquires merit by 
ordaining as a monk. 
 These decisions are based on the 
logic of karmic morality. They also 
illustrate the Buddhist principle of 
interdependence. Interdependence 
means that doctors, patients and 
relatives must think about the emotions 
and interests of all parties involved 
in a medical decision. This is in 
contrast to the Western concept of 
autonomy, which allows a patient to 
make decisions without consideration 
of the feelings and responsibilities of 
other people concerned. Dr. Nok’s 
solution to Gaew’s end-of-life is not just 
for Gaew, it is also for herself and for 
Lek. It is an ethics of compassion that 
must relieve the suffering of all people 
concerned. 
 One of us (PR), as a member of a 
team of Thai scholars, has worked for 
the last ten years to develop an applied 
ethics using principles such as karma, 
compassion, and interdependence 
[20–23]. In the West, the main purpose 
of a country-wide policy is to resolve 
conﬂ icts between individuals over 
medical decisions. However, because 
the concept of interdependence is 
so central for most Thais, Thailand’s 
bioethical policies may differ 
dramatically from those found in the 
West.
 Conclusion
 The purpose of this exploration has 
been to illustrate the need for Thailand 
and other countries to develop 
bioethical systems using local concepts. 
It would be a mistake, however, to leave 
our analysis of Thai bioethics without 
considering the term “Thai.” This has 
long been a problem with writings on 
“Asian values” or “Asian thinking.” 
 In this article, we have emphasized 
Buddhism as a major ethical system, 
but it is one of many such systems 
engaged in decisions about the end-of-
life in Thailand. Buddhist monasteries, 
lay Buddhist organizations, advocates 
of medical technology, public health 
ofﬁ cials, and lobbyists for the booming 
medical tourism industry are all 
engaged in vehement debate over 
what should guide Thailand in making 
medical decisions [10,11]. As with 
other countries, Thailand is not a 
place with a single ethics. In the same 
way that one cannot import concepts 
from the West to solve dilemmas in 
Thailand, one cannot haphazardly 
select a view within Thailand and label 
it as “Thai.” 
 Nonetheless, there is an urgent 
need for solutions to the “ventilator 
problem”—both to patch the failing 
universal health-care system and to 
help Thais make difﬁ cult decisions 
about intervention at the end-of-life. 
Thailand is just beginning the long 
process of integrating its multitude 
of local voices and concepts into 
nationwide ethical standards. This 
new Thai ethics promises to be much 
more effective at solving Thailand’s 
ethical problems than tools imported 
uncritically from the West.  
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